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The Policy Options Papers of the Policy Alternatives for Livestock Development in 
Mongolia Project (PALD) are short papers outlining the results of PALD research 
which are relevant to the major options facing Mongolian policy makers in the 
livestock field. They address issues of central concern in livestock sector policy 
reform. Timely information based on primary field research is important to ensure that 
new policies are appropriate to the specific conditions of Mongolia. 
PALD has been carrying out such research since 1991, before the start of rural 
privatisation. It is a collaborative research and training project between the Mongolian 
Research Institutes of Animal Husbandry and Agricultural Economics, and the 
Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, UK. Other Mongolian 
research institutes are also closely involved, notably those of Land Policy, and 
Geography and Geocryology. PALD reports are available in Mongolian from the 
Research Institute of Animal Husbandry, Zaisan, Ulaanbaatar, and in English from the 
Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. 
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SUMMARY 
This paper analyses and makes recommendations about options for grazing land tenure 
reform in Mongolia. Common grazing land makes up 79 percent of the total land area 
of Mongolia, and livestock production from it is the mainstay of the rural economy. 
New tenure arrangements are one of the most important decisions to be made during 
present economic and social reforms. 
Characteristics of grazing land 
Livestock production depends mainly on natural pasture, which in turn depends 
principally on low and variable rainfall. This limits pasture production in any one place. 
Herding households respond by moving within grazing territories which increase in 
size as mean rainfall diminishes and variability increases. This means that pastures can 
rarely be divided between individual households as viable private grazing lots: the 
areas available to each household would be too small and of varying productivity. 
Viable pastoral territories must include pastures for all four seasons, and for most 
years, and so must usually be quite large, although they vary considerably according to 
local ecological conditions. 
Customary pasture land tenure 
Mongolian herding communities are generally organised around the management of 
these viable grazing territories. They include small groups using the same well and 
adjacent pastures, and larger groups using a single mountain or river valley. Customary 
grazing rights have evolved as a set of social customs regulating behaviour within and 
between such groups, including informal mechanisms to allocate pastures to 
households, to monitor and enforce compliance, and to resolve conflicts. These 
customary land tenure arrangements within and between neighbourhood groups of 
different sizes continued to a large degree through the collectivisation period. They 
work well most of the time but cannot now cope with the pressures of privatisation 
unless new, formal (ie laid down in written law) systems of land tenure are adopted 
which support and extend them. This process is under way with the draft Land Law 
currently being discussed by Parliament. 
Objectives of tenure reform 
Grazing land tenure reform should be guided by three main objectives: improved 
economic efficiency, social justice and equity, and environmental sustainability. These 
objectives are closely interrelated. They may sometimes conflict, but more often 
support each other. 
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Problems in grazing land tenure reform 
There are several important problems to be faced in designing a new grazing tenure 
system. There have been recent changes in the geographic distribution of livestock, 
which have become more concentrated round sum centres and, as a result of 
privatisation, around the four main towns. There has been a substantial increase in the 
number of herding households as a result of privatisation, economic liberalisation, and 
urban to rural migration. Such households are usually not well integrated into herding 
communities and are thus less likely to abide by customary tenure arrangements. Urban 
animal owners who have their animals herded by rural households (absentee herd-
ownership) also create problems. 
Overgrazing is seen by some as a serious problem; although there is probably no 
general overgrazing problem, there are local problems, especially where customary 
tenure arrangements have been undermined. Finally, the Mongolian state urgently 
needs to find new sources of revenue, and considers grazing fees as one solution. 
Available tenure options 
There is a wide variety of options theoretically open for consideration in grazing land 
tenure reform. In practice, only a small number are likely to be useful. The basic 
distinction is between state and private ownership. State land can be held by herders 
either as individual or group leaseholders. Private property may be held individually or 
by groups as freehold or leasehold. Pastoral private freehold property, such as winter 
shelters, should usually be subject to restrictions on disposal. 
Land legislation 
The draft Land Law now before Parliament has several strengths from the point of 
view of grazing land tenure: it prohibits the privatisation of common grazing land, 
provides for leasing of common grazing and other state land, limits the transfer of lease 
rights to other people, provides for compensation on termination of ownership of lease 
rights, and imposes strong obligations on land users to protect the environment. 
It also has some weaknesses: there is too much emphasis on the obligations of land 
users and not enough on their rights; it gives excessive powers to the state to terminate 
land rights on unspecified grounds; it does not guarantee land users the right to renew 
their lease provided they have met all existing obligations and conditions; it does not 
adequately protect lease rights of members of households other than the named 
household head; it does not make clear whether informal groups of herders can lease 
grazing land; it is not clear what will be the state authority responsible for 
administering the law; there are insufficient safeguards against the transfer of high 
quality land into private individual ownership; penalties are too low in a period of rapid 
inflation; and there are insufficient safeguards against the abuse of administrative 
power over land tenure. These weaknesses should be remedied partly in the final form 
of the Land Law itself, and partly in a general Land Policy to accompany the law. 
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Security of tenure and land titling 
Tenure security is necessary for productive and sustainable land management. Land 
titling - the process of registering and certifying existing informal or new rights in land 
- is often considered necessary to increase tenure security, as well as to increase credit 
and encourage land markets. However, tenure security can be achieved under 
Mongolian conditions by a process short of full land titling, and especially by 
strengthening existing informal tenure rights at the level of herder groups, by 
registering grazing land title to such groups. Grazing land title is not, under Mongolian 
conditions, needed as security for credit, and title should not be used as the basis for 
creation of a market in grazing land, since this would encourage the privatisation and 
sale of the highest productivity pieces of land, without which the rest of the grazing 
system cannot be productive or sustainable. 
Proposed types of grazing land tenure 
This paper proposes a flexible range of tenure solutions for different resources in the 
grazing system. Taken together, these options make possible both the strengthening of 
customary grazing rights where appropriate, and increases in land resource 
productivity that are consistent with rural development in a market economy. 
Agricultural buildings and point resources, including winter shelters and small wells, 
should in general be held as private individual freehold property or state individual 
leasehold; in both cases, although the property would be heritable or transferable 
within families, it should not be saleable. 
Small-scale resources, such as land around winter shelters, intermediate capacity wells, 
and arable and hay fields opened and cultivated by individual households, should in 
general be held on individual leasehold from the state. In some areas, winter-spring 
pastures are also sufficiently distinct to justify individual state leases. 
Large-scale resources, such as summer and autumn pastures, large capacity wells and 
boreholes, and arable and hay land opened and cultivated by groups (such as former 
brigades, negdels and state farms, companies and other economic entities), should be 
held as group leasehold from the state. Where identifiable community groups such as 
well or valley groups exist at the appropriate level, they should be the leaseholder, 
constituted for this purpose as horshoo cooperatives. Where such customary groups 
do not exist, it may be necessary to encourage the creation of new economic entities at 
bag level to act as grazing land leaseholders. The only purpose of creating such entities 
is to give them legal protection as leaseholders; in no way does this represent the 
'collectivisation' of economic production. 
Table 1 in the main text summarises the proposed changes in tenure system for each of 
the main pastoral resources. 
Within all these new leasehold tenure systems, groups should be encouraged to make 
agreements on reciprocal access with neighbouring groups in exceptionally bad years, 
when the resources within the leased area are insufficient, or in cases where grazing 
resources are habitually shared by two or more leaseholder groups. 
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The draft Land Law can accommodate the proposed changes with minor modifications 
as specified in the main text. The law should provide only a broad legal framework for 
such a tenure system. A new Land Policy is also needed to give detailed guidance on 
how the proposed new grazing land tenure arrangements should be implemented. 
Group leases 
The main innovation proposed in this paper is for group leases for key grazing 
resources such as summer and autumn pastures. Where possible, such groups should 
be based on existing customary neighbourhood groups which already manage such 
resources. Most such leases should be issued on a rolling (ie regularly renewable well 
before expiry) basis for 30 to 40 years, subject to a satisfactory review of the 
performance of the leaseholder in keeping the conditions of the lease. 
Lease rights should be heritable within the household, but not saleable or otherwise 
transferable; in the event of expiry or termination, compensation should be paid for 
investments made. 
Grazing land fees 
The objectives of grazing land fees as currently planned in Mongolia are to formalise 
property rights in land, to encourage land users to manage land in a conserving 
manner, and to raise government revenue. 
Grazing fees will contribute towards the first objective if they are assessed on the 
territories leased by groups as a whole, and raised and paid by the group leaseholder. 
To achieve the second objective, in relation to land on which livestock concentration 
needs to be discouraged, the livestock head tax portion of the fee should be graduated, 
with tax per animal increasing as herd size increases. Taxes on grazing land should be 
substantially greater on land close to sum centres and on the best land than on less 
good land. 
Revenue from grazing fees should contribute towards the cost of administering the 
system of land management and protection. If more substantial fees are raised, a 
significant proportion should be paid into a local {bag or sum) fund for livestock 
development, including especially a new emergency fodder fund to protect herders in 
emergencies. Grazing fees should not be seen as an important additional source of 
government income. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyses options for grazing land tenure reform in Mongolia. Rural land 
tenure is a key issue in the economic and social transition now under way. During the 
period of the collectivised economy, land was owned by the state and decisions about 
the allocation and use of grazing land were made by the negdels. After the dissolution 
of the collectives and the emergence of many types of livestock production, as well as 
the new need to consider the most economic uses of land, grazing land tenure reform 
has become urgent. 
A distinction must be made between different types of land in Mongolia, as specified in 
the draft Land Law: 
- common land, including pasture land; 
- land for ownership or lease by economic entities and citizens, including urban 
and peri-urban land plots for construction and other forms of development, and 
arable cropland and land reserved as hay-making land; 
- land for state special needs and state reserve land, including border reserve 
areas, national parks and forest reserves, and pasture reserves for use during 
emergencies. 
By far the most important category of land overall is common grazing land on which 
pastoral livestock production - the mainstay of the rural economy - depends: this 
amounts to 79 percent of total land area. The principal concern of this paper is with 
common grazing land. But pasture tenure cannot be considered in isolation from other 
essential pastoral resources such as wells, hay fields and winter shelters. The term 
'grazing land1 as used in this paper includes not only pasture, but all these resources 
which are inseparable from it. 
The draft Land Law is due to be presented to the State Ikh Khural during its 1993 
autumn session. This paper analyses the results of PALD research relevant to the draft 
Land Law, and to other policies which may be adopted in the near future. 
This paper is concerned with grazing land tenure, that is to say with the specific 
question of how and under what circumstances land is to be owned, leased or 
otherwise used for livestock production. There is also the broader issue of land policy, 
which covers all the questions relating to use and control of land, including for 
example environmentally-permitted or recommended types of land use, or the 
responsibilities of different organisations. Some remarks about broader land policy are 
also made in this paper. 
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2 BASIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR GRAZING LAND TENURE UNDER 
MONGOLIAN CONDITIONS 
2.1 Environmental variability and risk 
Pastoral livestock production depends on direct grazing or fodder conservation arising 
from the growth of natural pasture, which in turn depends primarily on rainfall. Rainfall 
in Mongolia is low and variable in distribution, between seasons, between years, and 
between places, often on a very local scale. Although variability of rainfall and the 
production which depends on it is greatest in the Gobi, it also characterises steppe and 
forest/mountain steppe areas. Variability in pasture production is a primary risk for 
livestock production, and herders respond by moving their base camp and animals as 
necessary. The drier it is, the larger the area over which they need freedom of 
movement. There are other environmental risks as well, including heavy snowfall, 
steppe grass fires and predators. The relative importance of these risks varies from 
region to region. 
This degree of environmental variability, and the need for mobility, means that pastures 
cannot in most places be divided up among herders as individuals. The areas available 
to individual households would be too small. The only exceptions are in some cases 
pastures close to winter and spring shelters, which may be customarily owned by and 
inherited within individual families, some intensive sheep enterprises in the forest 
steppe, and in some cases intensive peri-urban dairy operations. Viable pastoral 
territories must include pastures suitable for all seasons and most years, and so must 
usually be quite large. Their size is determined by variable pasture production and 
other risks in different ecological zones. Within each area, pasture production is 
usually greater than a single family can use. Although individual families often have 
family grazing areas (nutag) they habitually use, sometimes for generations, these tend 
to overlap to form the annual grazing territories of whole communities; such territories 
tend in general to be quite large. Grazing land use therefore needs to be coordinated 
and managed in most cases at the level of groups of herders, rather than of individual 
households. The general term neg nutgiinhan ('people of one place') is often used to 
describe these groups. 
2.2 Local community territories 
The boundaries of these communities of herders and their grazing territory usually 
coincide. However, the size of viable grazing territories, and the appropriate level of 
social community corresponding to them, vary considerably from region to region 
according to ecological conditions. For example, in parts of Arkhangai aimag the 
appropriate community approximately coincides with a small river valley 
(approximately 200 sq. km.), and is known as neg jalgynhan ('one valley group'). In 
Dornogobi, grazing land use tends to be coordinated within small communities who 
use the same wells (neg usniihari), but they also need to share a larger territory -
approximately the size of the bag (eg. 3,500 sq. km.) - with other communities. 
Grazing land use rights in Mongolia have evolved as a set of social customs that 
herders agree upon within their local community group (see box 1). 
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Box 1: Informal customs to coordinate the use of common grazing land 
• the territorial boundaries and membership of community groups are more or less known 
and recognised by all members of the local herding community; 
• informal customs of grazing land use are more or less respected by most members of 
the local community: for example, agreed dates for moving to the next seasonal pasture 
area, respect for a family's customary rights over particular winter and spring pastures, 
respect for the general rights of neighbours to obtain enough forage and water for their 
animals; 
• ways exist to monitor pasture use within the community: for example, since herders often 
camp relatively close to their neighbours it is not difficult to detect those who are not 
following local customs of grazing land use; 
• ways may exist to resolve conflicts over grazing land: for example, in some places a 
committee of locally-respected herders may intercede on behalf of the community; 
» the community may bring social pressure on those who do not follow the rules; in 
extreme cases it may punish those who consistently abuse informal customs of grazing 
land use, for example by imposing a fine or temporary restrictions on animal 
management; in some places, such customary measures are supported by the bag 
administration, so formal and informal mechanisms are already in harmony. 
The territory of each herding community includes land of varying quality and 
productivity, which provides pasture suitable for each season of the year. In addition, 
at least in steppe and forest/mountain steppe areas, the community territory usually 
includes high-quality land reserved as hay meadows. Even in the Gobi, certain areas 
are reserved for hay-making and other types of fodder conservation. There may be 
other patches of high-quality resources too, such as groves of saxaul trees, used as 
emergency feed for goats or other animals when pasture is very scarce, as well as 
browse for camels. Many herding communities have evolved a set of customs (like 
those in box 1) to protect these high-quality resources. These are known as informal or 
customary land tenure arrangements. In some cases, following privatisation, horshoo 
cooperatives or companies have been formed by such customary groups to promote 
their members' interests. 
If, in an exceptional year, a group territory does not include enough high-quality feed, 
the group may make an arrangement with a group in a different district to allow it to 
use pasture in the territory of the second group when necessary. These arrangements 
often become regular and reciprocal, so that each group can plan to make emergency 
moves when it needs to. Under the collectives, negotiations were made between the 
negdel or sum chief representing herder communities in different districts to allow for 
such emergency moves, but they were normally based on existing customary 
arrangements. In some cases complex customary arrangements existed to allow two 
groups to share the same resource. 
When they operate successfully, such customs limit the use of better resources at times 
when pasture is not scarce, so that there is enough feed available when it is really 
4 
needed (eg. during a dzud). The same risks affect all herders, whether rich or poor, 
which is why it is in everyone's interest to observe the local customs of pasture use. 
Social customs do not work well all of the time, but they do work well enough most of 
the time to reduce the environmental risks facing all members of the community. 
The overall sustainability of grazing within each community territoiy depends on 
access to high-quality feed resources as well as to general pasture. If the better 
pastures and hay meadows are closed to a large number of local herders - for example, 
if they become the private property of a single herder who allows only his friends and 
close relatives to use them - the other members of the community will be forced to 
overgraze the remaining pastures. This is one reason why, on environmental grounds, 
the privatisation of grazing land does not make sense, and could be expected to 
accelerate land degradation. 
2.3 Grazing land tenure in law and in practice 
A distinction is made in this paper between rights of land ownership or possession as 
laid down in law (formal tenure rights) and land tenure customs that have evolved 
within herding communities (informal tenure rights). Informal tenure rights are like 
those listed in box 1. The view that grazing land in Mongolia is or has been subject to 
'open access' (ie. governed by no property regime at all) is incorrect. At least since 
1924, grazing land in Mongolia has been state property in law, and common property 
(ie. use rights are given by membership in the local community, and are shared with 
other herders in the community) in practice. 
Systems of regulating access to grazing land have existed for much longer than this. 
Chinggis Khan's son, Ogedei, who reigned from 1228 to 1241, probably elaborated the 
first pasture land tenure system in Mongolia (as well as developing irrigated pastures in 
the Gobi), based on customary law codified in the Great Yassa under Chinggis Khan. 
Under imperial Manchu law (17th-19th centuries), land use in Mongolia was closely 
regulated within a rigidly hierarchical system. Some land was privately owned by 
feudal lords (noyon) or monasteries whose serfs cared for their herds; other land was 
open to ordinary herders as serfs of the imperial state. Within those territories 
however, everyday questions of who was allowed access to what land, and when, were 
decided informally according to customs that had evolved within local communities. 
Under the 1924 Constitution of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic, all land became state 
property in law. From the 1960s the collectives began to play a role in deciding who 
should use which winter shelters, and gave guidance on the approximate dates 
individual camps should move. In spite of this, informal customs regarding grazing 
land use and management continued to play an important role throughout the period of 
collectivised production. 
Until the draft Land Law is approved, all land remains state owned. The new 1992 
Constitution of Mongolia recognises 'all forms of public and private property' (Article 
5, clause 2), and the state reserves the right of 'eminent domain' over all land. The 
Constitution allows for private land ownership but specifically excludes pasture land 
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from this provision (Article 6, clause 3). The draft Land Law will provide for the 
transfer into private ownership of certain categories of land, such as arable land, and 
urban and peri-urban land for development. Designated pasture land will remain in 
state hands, under the control of the relevant local (aimag and sum) authorities, as 
'common' land. This means it will be state-owned in law, and will continue to be 
common land in practice. 
One important difference between formal and informal tenure systems is the 
heterogeneity and separability of rights to different resources in the latter. Under 
customary tenure systems, different resources (such as wells or high quality resource 
patches) are often subject to different rights, with different rights holders; this is unlike 
most formal land tenure systems where all such rights are usually grouped together in a 
single right to land which includes all the renewable resources within the specified 
area, In some circumstances in Mongolian grazing land tenure reform it will be 
important to safeguard the separability of rights in order to maintain ecological 
flexibility in land use. 
All previous systems of grazing tenure have had both strengths and weaknesses, and 
customary land tenure has always involved conflicts. In most cases, rich herders have 
been able to use better pastures than poor herders, in part because they had better 
transport and so were able to move camp more easily. 
At present, customary and formal grazing rights coexist, at times in harmony, but at 
times in conflict. One purpose of grazing land reform will be to clarify responsibilities 
for grazing land management, by clearly establishing who are the responsible people 
(nutagchin) and institutions, both on the side of the users and of the administration at 
sum and bag level. One effect of this will be to reduce conflicts over land. 
2.4 Objectives of grazing land tenure reform 
Grazing land tenure reform needs to be guided by three main objectives, which are also 
criteria by which proposed reforms can be judged: these are improved economic 
efficiency, greater social justice or equity, and environmental sustainability. 
Economic efficiency means using grazing land resources in ways which optimise 
productivity in the context of a particular set of production goals and economic 
constraints. Social equity means providing a fair distribution of the benefits of 
production, creating effective measures against poverty, and providing safety nets for 
those who fail economically. Environmental sustainability means not allowing present 
uses to reduce future productivity of the resource. 
These three objectives are closely interrelated since under Mongolian conditions all 
three depend in large degree on individual participation in community-level action to 
regulate access to and control of resources, and to provide distributive and safety net 
mechanisms. The three objectives may on occasion clash with each other, but under 
Mongolian conditions such conflicts will occur less often than is sometimes supposed. 
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The objectives of environmental sustainability and economic efficiency can best be met 
by providing, among other things, enough security of tenure to herders that they can 
make decisions about use secure in the knowledge that other herders or the state 
cannot arbitrarily deprive them of the benefits of investments or conservative 
management. If pasture users are obliged to protect the environment, they must be 
assured that others will not come in and exploit the resources they have protected. 
Social justice and equity means ensuring that the costs and benefits of such actions are 
fairly shared within and between groups, which is also a condition for effective 
collective action. 
2.5 Other considerations 
Several other considerations are important to ensure that land tenure reform takes 
account of the specific conditions facing Mongolia today: 
Need to minimise disruption. The transition to the market economy is bringing about 
momentous changes in institutions throughout the country. This makes the conditions 
of livestock production unpredictable for herders. In order to ensure an adequate 
supply of food to towns, of raw materials to industry, and of agricultural commodities 
for export, it is important that the changes taking place in rural areas disrupt as little as 
possible those aspects of land management that continue to work well; 
Need for cost-effective government. Under the market economy, the functions of local 
or central government must be carried out as cheaply as possible. Mongolia has a large 
territory with low population density. This adds to the cost and difficulty of carrying 
out many government functions. The task of resource assessment and monitoring, for 
example, can only be carried out by the state, but will be very expensive under 
Mongolian conditions. As another example, the costs of administering a land lease 
system will be very large, if it attempts to register the grazing land normally used by 
every individual herding household; 
Need for policies to be 'self-policing'. One way of ensuring cost-effective government 
is to hand over as many decisions as possible to local communities. In this way it is 
possible to 'internalise' many of the costs of monitoring and enforcement of land 
policies. 
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3 WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS? 
3.1 Changing distribution of livestock 
Changes in the distribution of livestock have been taking place since the 1930s, 
especially during the period of collectivisation from the 1960s. These happened either 
as a result of better services and rural development in general, or as a result of 
attempts by the state to increase control over land use. These changes have had both 
positive and negative effects for the quality of pasture management and use. For 
example: 
- the total area of pasture to which any one group of herders officially had 
access became more restricted with the introduction of sum (district) 
boundaries rather than the khushuu, the previous territories of the feudal lords; 
- the collectives played an important role in allocating winter and spring 
shelters, sometimes to people who were not the customary owners, and in 
deciding when and where herding suur should move; provision of transport for 
camp moves by the collectives removed much of the competitive advantage 
previously enjoyed by rich households, and resulted in greater equity; 
- new areas of pasture were opened up by the sinking of new pump wells, but 
over time the wells also encouraged the concentration of animals in particular 
places; changes in livestock distribution were also caused by greater 
concentrations of herders along river valleys, and close to marketing facilities 
for example; 
- the increased provision of services (health, education) and availability of 
consumer goods in sum centres led to a relative decline in the mobility of 
herding camps; (the present decline in services has removed part of the reason 
for this, but herders now have reduced mobility because of lack of transport); 
- the regular provision of winter/spring animal feed supplements led to a 
gradual shift in the regional distribution of livestock. In some places it has 
allowed larger numbers of animals to be kept in areas short of livestock feed 
(eg. the Gobi); in others it distributed livestock more widely than before; the 
recent decline in fodder provision in the Gobi has prompted a shift back to 
camels and goats; 
- people were encouraged to move to the Gobi aimags: for example bonuses 
were paid to members of collectives in the Gobi, assistance was given to 
establish a household, such as an allowance for the purchase of a ger, and a 
higher number of private animals was permitted. 
Taken together, these changes increased the concentration of animals near sum 
centres, and in some areas of the Gobi in which grazing lands are more fragile and 
susceptible to degradation. In some cases this has led to excessive grazing pressure on 
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pastures close to sum centres. Informal means of coordinating the use of grazing land 
have not always been able to adjust to these changes. 
In some places, pastures have been undergrazed, because they are remote or have no 
water. Following privatisation, many of the new pump wells have broken down due to 
lack of maintenance and repair; the areas they served are now often undergrazed. 
Over the period of privatisation, further changes in the distribution of livestock have 
taken place. The overall change in the size of the national herd over the period 1990-
92 has been negligible, showing a slight net decline of -0.6 percent. However, data 
from the December 1992 livestock count reveal significant changes in the regional 
distribution of livestock over this period. 
Some of these changes have serious implications for grazing land management and 
policy. The most significant is the large increase in animals owned in the four main 
towns, as urban families acquired animals through the privatisation of state and 
collective herds. These municipalities show increases in livestock numbers of between 
33 percent (Darkhan) and 92 percent (Ulaanbaatar). This potentially threatens the 
sustainability of grazing on peri-urban pasture land, which includes some of the areas 
most at risk of degradation. 
3.2 Net urban to rural migration 
There were also large increases in total numbers of herding households by aimag and 
municipality during 1992. On average, the total number of herding households across 
the country increased by 25 percent. The increase in herding households in Ulaanbaatar 
is in proportion to the increase in total livestock in the municipality. Tuv aimag also 
showed a substantially larger than average increase of 46 percent. This includes at least 
four types of household: 
- families leaving the city for the countryside in response to rising urban 
unemployment and economic uncertainty, who acquired animals through the 
privatisation of state and collective herds. These are 'newcomers' to herding, or 
urban to rural migrants; 
- herders resident in towns, who take their animals out to graze each day in the 
surrounding countryside; 
- absentee herders who leave their animals with herding friends or relatives but 
who remain living in towns; 
- new households formed by the division of existing herding households, in 
order to gain more animals in total under privatisation, as well as more ration 
card goods. 
National data are not available to show the relative proportions of these different 
categories of household. However, PALD field data from Arkhangai and Dornogobi 
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suggest that the first category (newcomers) are the most significant; they were about 
20 percent of total households in the communities surveyed. 
This increase in herding households underlines the extent to which extensive livestock 
herding is considered to be a secure and productive economic opportunity. But it 
poses potential problems for sustainable land management within existing herding 
communities. The newcomers are usually less experienced herders, and less aware of 
the importance of local customs to coordinate use of grazing land. For example, they 
are more likely to stay at their winter pasture sites than to move to new pastures 
during the spring, autumn and summer. 
Newcomers also tend to move irregularly because they do not yet have winter shelters 
and established herding relationships within groups. They are often less integrated into 
rural communities, and are therefore less likely to take into account the benefits of 
cooperation with other herders in other ways, such as shared herding, helping to move 
camp, looking for lost animals, or making hay. Experienced herders of long standing in 
the community are more likely to cooperate with their neighbours over the use of 
grazing land, because they know that there are additional benefits to cooperation. The 
new herding households' primary loyalties are likely to remain towards the towns, 
rather than to the rural community. 
3.3 Absentee herd-ownership 
In the Mongolian pastoral economy in the past, it has not been unusual for one herder 
to herd animals belonging to other herders, for example on long distance otor 
migrations. However there is now a new phenomenon of absentee herd ownership. 
During privatisation, many people living in towns were able to acquire animals. These 
people include former officials, technical and support staff of the collectives living in 
sum centres, and other salaried professionals. Many continue to live in town, but leave 
their animals with friends or relatives in the countryside. The payment for looking after 
other people's animals is usually the free use of dairy products from those animals, 
perhaps a share of newborn animals. Sometimes this is a truly cooperative relationship 
between town and countryside. The owner may provide transport or cash loans; he 
may act as an intermediary for marketing, or lodge the herders' children when they go 
to school. Absentee herd ownership is not a problem where there are only a few 
animals being looked after. 
However, the size of herds belonging to absentee owners is increasing. This could 
become a serious problem, as experience in other countries shows. Under such 
conditions, there is a tendency for livestock to become a form of capital investment for 
richer people. Their herds may be looked after on a commercial, contract basis by 
herders with relatively few animals of their own. This affects the way the herd is 
managed. One result is that 'contract herders' have different interests in the use of 
pasture from locally resident herd owners. They are likely to be less concerned with 
the sustainability of pasture use in future, and less likely to observe local customs 
concerning pasture use. Absentee herd owners often want their animals to be kept 
close to them, adding to the concentration of animals around the towns. 
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Absentee herd ownership leads to many types of conflict between the owner of the 
animals and the herder, and between the herder and his community. These include 
disputes over use of inputs (should such animals be able to use fodder prepared by the 
community, who pays for dipping?), dissatisfaction over the terms of the contract, and 
disputes over the responsibility for animal deaths. In general, neighbours are unhappy 
when a khot ail member herds many animals for an absentee owner, because of such 
conflicts. Absentee herd ownership can become a way for townspeople to become 
important users of pasture leased to rural herders. In view of these potential problems, 
it may be that the terms of pasture leases should contain provisions limiting access to 
absentee owned herds. 
It is not yet clear how much of a problem absentee herd ownership has become in 
Mongolia, since the privatisation of animals has taken place very recently. Over time, 
however, if livestock ownership becomes concentrated into the hands of fewer private 
absentee owners - which it will if there are not alternative forms of investment for 
richer people - the danger for pasture land tenure and for social equity will become 
more acute. 
3.4 Environmental degradation 
Compared to some other pastoral countries, there is little pasture degradation in 
Mongolia. In most parts of the country, there is sufficient pasture for animals, and 
there has not been the sort of grazing pressure that might damage future pasture 
quality. The perceptions of most experienced herders confirm this. Social customs of 
the kind summarised in box 1, and the practice of the pastoral collectives, have 
effectively limited the use of high-quality pastures, and protected them over a long 
period of time. This acts like a safety valve to prevent overgrazing on other pastures. 
Experts in range ecology believe that in the long run, the production of pasture forage 
over much of Mongolia is determined by the local precipitation pattern rather than by 
the number of animals grazing on them. Heavy grazing pressure may mean there is less 
pasture available for animals to feed on in the short term, but in the long term it will 
not affect the future production of pasture forage, since this will recover when there is 
sufficient and timely precipitation, 
However, this does not mean that overgrazing may not become a problem in some 
places in the near future. Already the changes in livestock distribution described above 
have increased the concentration of animals in certain places, especially near sum 
centres and the municipalities. This is particularly a problem in places where social 
customs have been unable effectively to control the use of pasture, either because the 
speed of change following privatisation, or the increase in the number of animals in the 
locality, has been too great. In some cases, vegetation covering the ground surface has 
been removed, exposing the soil to erosion by wind and surface runoff following 
storms. Vehicles driven over unsurfaced tracks are also a problem in this respect. 
Some people think that rodent damage to pasture is also a serious problem in some 
places. Competition for available forage between wild and domestic herbivores may be 
highly significant in some areas and deserves closer monitoring. 
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3.5 Need to raise government revenue 
A final problem is that the Mongolian state urgently needs to find new sources of 
revenue to pay for livestock development. Various forms of taxation have begun since 
the Taxation Law was passed, including income tax from herders on their animals. But 
it is difficult to tax directly the companies and cooperatives that have replaced the 
collectives. Taxation is not the specific concern of this paper, However, the question 
will arise, how will the costs of implementing the policy options outlined in this paper 
be met? In the case of grazing fees, for example, raising revenue for local (bag, sum 
and aimag) authorities is an explicit objective, in addition to their primary stated 
objective of encouraging conservative land use practices. In the case of land leasing, 
however, for reasons discussed below, it is unlikely that even the costs of 
administering the system, including resource assessment and monitoring, could be met 
from a charge on the lease. Nevertheless, the principle that grazing fee and land lease 
revenues should contribute towards the cost of administering the land management 
system is a good one. 
If revenue is to be raised through fees and taxes of this sort, there is an argument for 
directing it into a local, probably sum level, fund for livestock development, and 
especially into building up a renewed SEFF-type operation to meet emergency fodder 
needs. 
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4 NEW POLICIES ON GRAZING LAND TENURE 
This section summarises the main grazing land tenure options available, the legal 
framework, specific options for implementing the Land Law such as land leasing, and 
economic policy instruments such as grazing fees. Land leasing implies some kind of 
land titling. Achieving the objectives of land tenure reform will also require a broader 
set of policies and economic incentives to create a favourable environment for 
sustainable livestock production. Some of these will be the concern of the Land Policy 
document due to be prepared after the Land Law enters into force. Others, however, 
relate to other issues and incentives including livestock and livestock product prices, 
the creation of an efficient transport and marketing infrastructure, and the provision of 
social services. These are not the concern of this paper, but it is important to recognise 
that policies taken in isolation, such as land policy reform alone, will not achieve the 
broad objectives set out above. 
4.1 Available tenure options 
There is a large variety of options theoretically available for grazing land tenure reform 
in Mongolia. The basic distinction laid down in the Constitution and the draft Land 
Law is between state and private ownership. State owned land can be held by citizens 
and entities under several tenurial forms, but the main one of interest in pastoral areas 
is leasehold (referred to as 'possession' in the draft Land Law), which may be held by 
an individual or by a group. Private property may be held as freehold ('ownership' in 
the draft Land Law), or leasehold, with property of each of these tenure types held 
individually or collectively by groups. These theoretically possible options are shown 
diagramatically in figure 1. 
Figure 1. Theoretically possible tenure options in Mongolian grazing systems 
Ownership Private Public/state 
Tenure freehold leasehold leasehold other 
('ownership') ('possession') ('possession') 
Benef- / \ / \ / \ 
iciaries indiv. group indiv. group indiv. group 
Option A B C D E F 
Several points should be made about this schema. First, private individual freehold 
(option A) is not permitted for pasture by the Constitution, although it is permitted and 
will presumably be important for winter shelters and other physical structures such as 
corrals and houses built in winter or summer pastures, and perhaps also for small wells 
and watering facilities such as troughs in some cases. Second, private group freehold 
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(option B) is also theoretically possible in the case of certain more intensive operations 
such as dairy fattening farms. This option may become more significant in future. 
Third, the option of private leasehold property (options C and D) is permitted in 
general under the new draft Land Law, subject to the permission of the appropriate 
state authority. This would allow those other than the owner to use arable land or 
point resources such as small wells for short periods under contract with the owner. It 
does not apply to pasture. Fourth, private individual freehold tenure (option A) can be 
granted either without restriction, or with restrictions such as covenants limiting the 
owner's rights to exploit, dispose of or otherwise manage his property. Certain 
restrictions on environmental grounds are made in the draft Land Law, for example. 
Leaseholds (options C, D, E and F) usually have conditions attached to the lease itself, 
and these can be changed when the lease in renewed. 
Fifth, the separability of resources means that different tenure systems can apply to 
different types of resource which coexist in the same area: for example, there is no 
conceptual problem in combining private freehold individually owned winter shelters 
(or in some cases wells) (option A), with public leased common pasture land (option 
F). Seasonal constraints may make it desirable for different tenure types to apply to 
different categories of resources, so that households operate within one tenure system 
in one place in one season, and a different system in a different place in other seasons. 
Sixth, the existence of shared pastoral resources, such as grazing areas used alternately 
by different groups, means that there should perhaps be special lease agreements 
covering such shared use. 
Last, it is assumed that leases will be issued in the first instance on the basis of existing 
uses. In time, however, it will be necessary to make possible changes in land use on 
certain categories of land (such as arable land, for example, or peri-urban land), since 
there is no guarantee that the existing use is or will remain the best (or highest value) 
use of that land. A possible means to achieve this, where the sale of lease rights is 
prohibited, is to sub-lease temporarily to individuals or to groups for certain uses, 
subject to the approval of the state land management authority. The draft Land Law 
wisely restricts the extent to which the transfer of pasture land to different types of 
use is permitted, as discussed below, but in the case of relatively more intensive land 
uses, the possibility of transfer between uses is important. 
In practice, given these considerations, the most important tenure options for grazing 
land reform in Mongolia from this variety of theoretically possible options are likely to 
be private individual freehold (option A) and public leasehold (options E and F). Inter-
aimag and inter -sum grazing reserves will continue to be held as public land (under the 
'other' category), as will land belonging to state organisations. Grazing reserves for use 
during emergencies are extremely important and should be maintained in public 
ownership for this purpose or, for smaller scale reserves, maintained by contract 
agreements between companies or corporate groups of herders. 
14 
4.2 Land legislation 
Much work has already been done in reforming the laws relevant to land: they include 
the Constitution, the draft Land Law, and amendments to the Civil Code. The general 
draft Land Law of Mongolia relates to all categories of land. Its objective is to regulate 
the ownership, possession, use and protection of Mongolia's land resources. 
The Law has several major strengths. The most important are that: 
It prohibits the privatisation of common grazing land. This is anyway prohibited in 
the Constitution (Article 6, clause 3). This paper has set out the main reasons why the 
privatisation (ie. transfer into the hands of individual citizens) of grazing land is not 
possible; and why, if privatisation of pasture land were attempted, it would lead to 
disruption of pastoral livestock production on a major scale, and could be expected to 
accelerate land degradation; 
It provides for leases of common grazing land and other state-owned land of 'up to 60 
years' (Article 10, clause 1); the Civil Code specifies a lower limit of leases as 15 
years. These provisions allow sufficiently long periods for security of tenure. Other 
conditions also have to be met for real security of tenure however. These are discussed 
below; 
It specifically prohibits the transfer of possession rights by leaseholders to others 
(Article 11, clause 2). Possession rights automatically cease on the death or 
disappearance of the possessor or the dissolution or bankruptcy of the possessing 
entity (Article 12, clause 1). In principle this should prevent the subdivision of 
common grazing areas into parcels that are too small to be used sustainably by the 
local community. But this can also be a weakness, as discussed below; 
It provides for compensation in the event of termination of land ownership or 
possession rights. This helps to provide security to land users to carry out land 
improvements or otherwise invest in land. However, this right is stronger for land 
owners than land possessors, since the right to compensation for owners is protected 
in the Constitution. For possessors it is only stated in the draft Land Law, which could 
potentially be superseded by later legislation; 
It is strong in terms of the obligations it imposes on land users to protect the 
environment. However, it might be useful to add a more explicit commitment to 
protect wild animals on leased land. It should also be recognised that regulations alone 
will not achieve the desired environmental objectives; economic incentives are equally 
important. 
A number of weaknesses remain in the revised land legislation, however, including: 
In general, there is too much emphasis on the obligations of land users, and too little 
emphasis on their rights. As discussed in section 2.5 of this paper, the need for cost-
effective government is one reason why land policies should as far as possible be self-
enforcing. The Land Law should give land users enough rights (security of tenure) so 
that they feel it is in their interest to meet their obligations. This is better than land 
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users feeling that they have so few rights (little security of tenure) that they will try to 
evade being caught by the local authority for failing to meet their obligations. 
The state has excessive powers to terminate land rights on unspecific grounds. The 
Law states that 'land may be expropriated by the state for common use and state 
special needs' (Article 6, clause 1), but does not specify what these are other than 
those 'determined by the Great Khural' (Article 9). It is recommended that the grounds 
for termination of land rights be more clearly specified in Article 9 of the draft Land 
Law; these might include for example national security, overriding national economic 
interest, or causing severe ecological damage; 
The Law does not automatically guarantee the right of land users to renew their 
possession rights (lease), provided all the existing obligations and conditions under 
the lease have been complied with. This is most important for providing enough 
security to land users that they feel it is in their interest to maintain land quality. It is 
recommended that this provision be addressed in the terms of the leases for common 
grazing land; 
The Law does not adequately protect the possession rights of members of households 
other than the named household head. Under the Law, possession rights automatically 
cease on the death or disappearance of the possessor. In ' the case of herding 
households, either individually or as members of a group, the 'possessor' is not defined, 
but can be assumed to refer to the household head. The possession rights of other 
members of the household may therefore be presumed to cease on the death or 
disappearance of the person registered as the household head. There is an important 
question of equity here, concerning the rights especially of widows and children. It is 
recommended that, in the event of death or disappearance of the household head 
named in the lease as the 'possessor', possession rights should be inherited by the new 
head of household (eg. widow in the case of the death of her husband). Although the 
Civil Code does provide for such inheritance of possession rights by the next of kin 
within the immediate family, this issue needs to be clarified in the Land Law to prevent 
any misinterpretation; 
It is not clear whether 'entities and citizens' who may lease common grazing land can 
include informal groups of herders. For reasons set out in this paper, it is 
recommended that grazing land should continue to be possessed by groups of herders 
at the appropriate level, depending on local ecological conditions. Two questions then 
arise: what land-holding (corporate) group needs to be recognised by the local 
authority, and what it needs to do to become incorporated (formally recognised); and 
how should its rights and obligations be certified; 
It is not clear what is to be the 'state competent authority' responsible for 
administering general land policy, land management and resource assessment and 
monitoring procedures as specified in the Law. This makes it difficult to judge how far 
the relevant authority is likely to be able to carry out its duties. A general land policy 
needs to be drafted ready for discussion immediately after discussion of the draft Land 
Law, since aimag authorities are expected to begin implementing schemes grazing fees 
as soon as the Law in ratified. It is recommended that the 'competent state authority' 
for land matters be defined as soon as possible in this general land policy; 
I 
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There are insufficient safeguards against the possibility that high-quality land (eg. 
hay-making land) could be removedfrom common use and transferred into individual 
ownership. Officials of the relevant local authority could be 'persuaded' to reclassify 
particular areas as land suitable for private ownership. It would be difficult and costly 
for higher authorities to monitor this situation closely, especially when dealing with 
quite small areas of land; 
The section on penalties for violations of the Law is weak in that it specifies the level 
of fines for particular violations. These sums of money are rapidly becoming very 
small owing to inflation. They are unlikely to be much of a disincentive to land 
possessors to violate the terms of their lease. Some land possessors may even plan to 
violate the terms of their lease and pay the fine as a regular 'charge' for doing so. It is 
recommended that the level of fines specified in the draft Land Law be reviewed; 
There are insufficient safeguards against the abuse of power by administrative 
employees responsible for punishing violations of land legislation. It is easy for such 
abuses of power to go undetected. Even if local people inform the authorities if they 
suspect abuses are taking place, it is more effective and cheaper for the authorities to 
strengthen land users' rights in order to encourage them to meet their obligations. 
The Law states that 'the Government of Mongolia may devise a general policy on land, 
including the control of the state over the possession, use and protection of land' 
(Article 5, clause 2). The weaknesses in the Law set out above could be addressed in 
part by means of such a policy. The specific content of that policy should include the 
precise specification of the policy instruments discussed below: land titling in general, 
group land leases for common grazing in particular, and grazing land fees. 
4.3 Security of tenure and land titling 
Tenure security is necessary for productive and sustainable land management. Land 
users will not invest their labour or capital in land unless they are convinced they alone 
will reap the benefits of that investment over a relatively long period. This is true both 
for private land ownership and for land held in common. 
Land titling is the process of legal registration and certification of land ownership or 
possession rights. It either involves the registration of existing informal rights, or 
registration accompanied by a redefinition of rights. Land titling is often suggested as a 
way of improving tenure security over grazing land. There are arguments for and 
against this under Mongolian conditions however. In particular, the process of land 
titling, and the administrative system required to back it up, are very expensive and 
time-consuming for local and central government authorities. 
The absence of legal title does not necessarily mean that tenure is insecure. Under 
certain conditions, customary tenure arrangements can provide security of tenure 
without being legally defined. Nor does legal title necessarily provide tenure security, if 
rights are not clearly defined, or if the state lacks the authority or the means to enforce 
the newly established rights. 
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Under Mongolian conditions, enough security of tenure to provide incentives to 
herders to manage their land in an economically efficient and ecologically sustainable 
manner can be achieved by partial titling, or the allocation of renewable pasture leases 
to legally constituted groups. The objective of social equality will also be promoted by 
ensuring that all herders, regardless of wealth or social position, can be guaranteed 
access to grazing land as part of an organised group. 
The other objectives of land titling - to increase demand for credit by using land as 
collateral, and to foster a market in land - are not appropriate to Mongolian pastoral 
conditions. The draft Land Law wisely prohibits the mortgaging of land as collateral, 
and Mongolian banks consider livestock to be adequate collateral for small loans, 
especially to groups. And the development of a market in pasture land would, at this 
stage in the economic transition, be undesirable. If such a market were allowed to 
develop, land of highest productivity would be first to be sold. The variability of 
pasture means that herders need access to high-quality grazing land, hay meadows or 
browse trees as a way of coping with ecological hazards at particular times. The early 
privatisation of this higher quality land, so that it was no longer available to other 
herders, would threaten the sustainability of the grazing system as a whole. 
4.4 Proposed types of grazing land tenure 
The complexity of existing resource allocation and tenure rules, varying ecological and 
economic requirements, and differing land use strategies followed by Mongolian 
herders suggests that there is no single solution to grazing land tenure reform. 
Different resources - even different seasonal types of use - will require different tenure 
systems. During the course of a single year, herding households will use resources with 
varying tenure status. And prevailing tenure systems will differ on the same resources, 
according to local conditions, in different parts of Mongolia. 
The objectives of land tenure reform listed earlier (economic efficiency, social equity 
and environmental sustainability) will best be achieved by a mix of tenure types, with 
tenure arrangements adapted to resources and zones, with flexibility in the system to 
allow local adoption of the tenure system best suited to particular local conditions. The 
new Land Law should set out a legal framework of permitted tenure forms, from 
which particular local variants would be chosen. The broader Land Policy which has 
yet to be drafted should set out in detail the way the tenure system should operate in 
particular local circumstances. 
The legal framework might include the following provisions: 
Agricultural buildings and point resources 
A first category of resources are those generally built structures which are easily 
appropriated and managed by individual households, or which are already and should 
in most cases be held as individual private freehold or in some cases individual public 
leasehold. Such resources include winter and spring shelters, corrals and other farm 
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buildings, and shallow wells and drinking troughs constructed by individuals. Such a 
tenure regime would also apply to houses built in winter or summer pastures. 
The draft Land Law provides for the inheritance of land owned by citizens on which 
there are built structures. This provision is intended to refer specifically to the sites on 
which winter shelters, corrals and other fencing structures stand. It provides for tenure 
security within herding families that may facilitate investments at winter camps. 
Such tenure status, whether private individual freehold or public individual leasehold, 
should be subject to conditions: such property should be constructed only with 
authorisation from the appropriate authorities (in most cases the bag)-, it would be 
inheritable or transferable within the immediate family (which would need to be 
defined) but could not be sold, since sale of winter shelters, small wells or houses 
would enable strangers with no customary pasture rights in the area to obtain a base 
there, disrupting the system of local community control. 
Small-scale resources 
A second category of pastoral resources is made up of the land immediately 
surrounding winter shelters and houses (say a maximum of 1 ha per site), intermediate 
capacity wells constructed by the former collectives, springs where individuals have 
made investments to channel and store water, arable fields opened by individual 
households or small groups with official authorisation, and in some areas hay fields. 
Such resources should probably be held on individual public leasehold, according to 
the rolling lease model described in section 4,5 below. In some areas, the winter and 
spring pastures used by each household are sufficiently distinct to warrant individual 
rolling leases of this sort, although in other areas this is not so. 
No changes are required in the draft Land Law to give effect to these provisions, other 
perhaps than those required to allow rolling leases. 
Large-scale resources 
Large-scale pastoral resources, used by many people, include summer and autumn 
pastures, winter-spring pastures in some places, large capacity wells and boreholes. 
These resources are used in many cases by identifiable and relatively stable community 
groups (neg nutgiinhan), such as valley and well-user groups, according to the 
customary procedures outlined in box 1. The tenure system best adapted to these 
resources is group public leasehold, in which the customary user group holds the lease 
on behalf of its members and is responsible for compliance with its provisions. The 
community group would agree among themselves on procedures for joint possession 
of large-scale pastoral resources, and approach the sum government for official 
recognition as leaseholder. As a general rule, the leaseholding group should be the 
smallest group of herders consistent with the ecologically viable grazing territory. The 
larger the group, the more difficult becomes the task of monitoring and enforcing 
compliance with lease provisions among its members. 
Where such customary user groups do not exist at the appropriate level or are 
insufficiently stable or cohesive, as is often the case in drier regions such as the Gobi, it 
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will be necessary to find a representative larger group which can take on the 
responsibilities of leaseholder. In some cases this would logically be the company, or a 
horshoo cooperative; the existing entity could simply approach the sum administration 
for official recognition as the leaseholder. In others, the bag represents a group of 
herders and a grazing territory of approximately the right size. However the bag itself 
cannot be the leaseholder: it is not a territorial unit, and there would be a conflict of 
jurisdiction with its role as an organisation of state control within the administrative 
hierarchy. In such circumstances, the best solution may be to encourage the creation of 
an economic entity, as a company or horshoo, at bag level, with a separate 
organisational and decision-making structure, and allocate a group pasture lease to this 
entity. 
In some areas a single lease could cover the pastures of the group in all seasons of the 
year; this could be the case of leases held by the farg-level economic entities. In others, 
seasonal pastures would be subject to separate leases, even to a separate legal regime, 
with summer-autumn pastures held under group leases and winter-spring areas under 
individual leases. 
To give effect to these proposals, either or both of two changes could be adopted. 
First, the Land Law needs to be slightly modified to allow community groups to hold 
leases of public land. This could be achieved by revising clause 2 of article 16 in the 
draft to state that citizens should be entitled to possess pasture land jointly; in the 
present draft, only 'citizens and economic entities' are admitted as potential 
leaseholders. Second, the definition of economic entity (in the Law on Economic 
Entities) could be extended to provide official recognition of community groups as 
corporate entities for the purpose of leasing land. This need not imply that the 
corporate entity has any other direct economic function. However, the simplest 
solution may be to require such groups to constitute themselves as cooperatives or 
horshoo, which are considered economic entities under existing law. 
Some pastoral resources, such as inter-sum, inter-aimag and state grazing reserves for 
emergencies, will remain in state control, their status unchanged. 
The changes proposed here in tenure status from the present situation are summarised 
for each main category of pastoral resource in table 1. 
Two further general points need to be made. The first concerns reciprocal access on 
pasture and water leases. The risky nature of Mongolian pastoral environments means 
that even quite large leased grazing territories will not provide enough resources in 
occasional years of great scarcity, usually caused by drought or heavy snowfall. In 
such years, herders have to move to neighbouring territories. Such movements took 
place in pre-revolutionary Mongolia, and continued during the period of 
collectivisation. They are an essential survival mechanism, especially in risky areas like 
the Gobi, and a new and more formalised grazing land tenure system should not be 
allowed to undermine them. The terms of group and individual pasture leases should 
encourage the possessor or leaseholder (whether a group or individual) to make 
agreements with neighbouring leaseholders for reciprocal access in case of emergency. 
In the Gobi, similar agreements may be necessary for reciprocal access to wells. 
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Table 1. Proposed changes in tenure for pastoral resources 
RESOURCE PRESENT(1993)TENURE PROPOSED TENURE 
winter-spring 
shelters, corrals, 
houses; small 
capacity wells 
largely private 
individual 
private 
individual 
freehold 
with restrictions 
intermediate 
capacity wells 
public individual 
public 
leasehold 
land immediately 
surrounding 
winter shelters 
and houses 
public individual 
public 
leasehold 
individual 
arable fields 
public individual 
public 
leasehold 
hay fields public individual 
or group 
public 
leasehold 
winter-spring 
pastures 
public individual 
or group 
public 
leasehold 
summer-autumn 
pastures 
public group 
public 
leasehold 
large capacity 
wells 
public group 
public leasehold 
collective arable 
and fodder fields 
public group 
or company 
public 
leasehold 
state grazing 
reserves 
public public or inter-
group or company 
The second point concerns the khot ail as a potential leaseholder group. In some areas 
khot ail composition is perhaps stable enough to justify issuing leases to it as a land 
managing unit; in many others, however, khot ail compos.ion changes regularly 
according to seasonal and other conditions, and it does not have thu stability to act as a 
leaseholder. 
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Few changes would be needed in the draft Land Law to put into effect the proposals 
made here. First, it would be desirable to outline the provisions for rolling leases with 
automatic renewal, subject to satisfactory evaluation, for grazing land and other 
resources, as described in section 4.5 below. Second, it may be desirable to make clear 
that individual public leasehold is a possible option for specific resources, including 
household hay, fodder and arable fields, some wells, and in certain circumstances 
winter-spring pastures. 
It may also be desirable specifically to mention in the Law that customary resource-
management groupings of herders (neg nutgiinhari), notably well and valley groups 
where they exist, constituted as economic entities under existing legislation, should be 
eligible for such leases. 
The Land Law needs do no more than provide a legal framework for the tenure 
options outlined above, which will in most cases be implemented by the sum and bag 
administration; it should not specify the details of each. This is the task of the general 
Land Policy which has yet to be drafted. This Land Policy will be an important 
document, giving detailed guidance on how the provisions of the Land Law should be 
applied in particular cases. Preparation of this Land Policy should be given high 
priority. 
4.5 Group land leases for common grazing 
This section makes specific recommendations on group land leases for common 
grazing. It includes details of the nature and terms of such leases, and how they could 
be monitored and enforced. 
What group? The draft Land Law allows for the leasing of common grazing land by 
economic entities as well as Mongolian citizens. The Law on Economic Entities covers 
public and limited liability companies, and public and limited liability cooperatives 
(horshoo). Other, informal groups are not recognised. These include, for example khot 
ail, valley or well groups, and other local communities. The bag is an administrative 
unit, not a corporate group. Since land leasing implies a degree of formal land titling, it 
is recommended that community groups such as neg nutgiinhan, well or valley groups, 
within which common grazing is coordinated, should be allowed to become 
incorporated (officially recognised) as cooperatives (horshoo) for the purpose of 
leasing their existing grazing land. At least in some areas, this is happening anyway, for 
the purposes of marketing livestock products and purchasing inputs such as fodder. 
Such groups are likely to range in size between approximately ten and one hundred 
households. Where there are no stable customary resource-managing groups of this 
sort, the formation of new economic entities, often at bag level, should be encouraged, 
as discussed in the previous section. It is emphasised that the formation of such entities 
is in no way similar to the 'collectivisation' of economic production; its only purpose is 
to give the leaseholding group legal recognition and protection of its rights under 
existing law. 
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Group membership In all cases, the corporate group should be allowed to define its 
own membership, as well as rules governing entry to and exit from the group, on 
condition this does not allow richer or more powerful groups to exclude weaker 
neighbours. The bag administration should be given responsibility to ensure this does 
not occur. The membership of households in economic entities is usually registered 
under the name of the household head. This person is usually a man. In cases where 
there is no adult male in the household, and the household is therefore headed by a 
woman, under existing practice the eldest son is usually registered as the household 
head. This can give rise to problems of equity, It is recommended that women-headed 
households and single, independent women be specifically named in the lease along 
with all other households in the lease-holding group. 
How long a lease? Existing legislation allows for leases of 15-60 years. It is 
recommended that leases be issued on a continuous, 'rolling' basis, ie, that they are 
monitored and reviewed regularly (eg. every 10 years) to ensure that the land leasing 
group is complying with its obligations under the Land Law. As a rough guideline, the 
term of the lease should be three to four times the length of the review period. At each 
review, new rights or obligations may be added to the existing ones, in case of 
unforeseen changes. 
Renewal of lease It is recommended that the lease-holding group has the automatic 
right to renew its lease, provided all existing obligations have been complied with. 
With a continuous, rolling lease as described above, this means that the lease will 
automatically roll forward as long as the conditions are met. This gives the group the 
security of tenure it needs for productive and sustainable land management. For 
example, a lease of 40 years that is first reviewed after 10 years should be renewed, 
with another 10 years added on at the end, making a total of 40 years again, provided 
the land users have shown they have met all their obligations under the Land Law and 
the lease. 
Disposal of lease rights It is recommended that lease rights be inherited by another 
member of the household in the event of the death or disappearance of the person 
registered on the lease (usually the head of household). For example, lease rights 
should be inherited by the widow in the event of her husband's death. While the 
inheritance of such rights by the next of kin within the immediate family is provided for 
in the Civil Code, it would be desirable to clarify this issue specifically in relation to 
land leases, in the Land Law. Lease rights should not be transferable by sale. 
Compensation in the event of expiry or termination It is recommended that all 
relevant provisions in the draft Land Law concerning full compensation in the event of 
expiry or termination of the lease should apply. This applies to the value of the lease 
itself, where a charge is made for the lease, and to all structures built or land 
improvements carried out during the lease period (less depreciation costs). 
Compliance with obligations It is recommended that it is the responsibility of the 
group as a whole to ensure that its individual members play their part in complying 
with obligations under the Land Law and the lease. The group may decide on a set of 
more specific rules to ensure that its members jointly respect their obligations (eg. by 
setting dates each year for moving to particular seasonal pastures). These rules will 
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usually be based on the kind of customs set out in box 1. If an individual member of 
the group flouts these rules, or any specific obligations under the lease (for example, to 
avoid grazing an area designated as 'severely degraded'), then other members of the 
group are expected to notice, to bring this fact to the individual's attention, and to 
punish consistent offences where necessary. 
All these decisions should be the internal affairs of the lease-holding group itself. The 
relevant local authority (usually the bag) should not become involved, except in the 
case of serious disputes that cannot be resolved by the local community, or disputes 
between neighbouring lease-holding groups. In this way, the monitoring and 
enforcement costs to the local authority of the lease system are considerably reduced, 
and the system is more likely to be effective; 
Reciprocal grazing rights between lease-holding groups In times of emergency, the 
herders in a given community (A) may need to use grazing leased by another herder 
community (B). At some other time, community (B) may need to use reserve grazing 
in the territory leased by community (A). It is recommended that these reciprocal 
rights be specified by separate contract between the lease-holding groups (A) and (B). 
In some cases, such shared access to a single area will be a regular feature of two 
communities' grazing strategies. It should be the responsibility of the communities 
concerned to negotiate the details of such arrangements, with the sanction and 
approval of the bag authorities. The standard terms of pasture leases should make 
provision for such reciprocal and shared access. 
4.6 Grazing land fees 
The idea of making herders pay a fee for use of grazing land has already been accepted 
by the government in Mongolia. The stated objectives of land use fees in Mongolia are: 
- to move towards greater formalisation of property rights in agricultural land; 
- to provide an incentive to land users to manage land in a conserving manner. 
By making land users pay for their rights to land, they are to be encouraged to 
think of it as having a value rather than being free. Different fee levels will be 
used to encourage the desired changes in herders' land use practices, for 
example by heavily taxing people who overstock, and especially to distribute 
grazing pressure more in relation to ecological productivity; 
- to raise government revenue. It is intended that this will make a contribution 
to the costs of land administration, resource assessment and monitoring, and 
the enforcement of land legislation. 
For common grazing land, a methodology has been devised by the Research Institute 
of Land Policy (RILP) and the Institute of Agricultural Economics (IAE) to evaluate 
land and set grazing fees and fees for cropland use. It is based on assessment of 
physical land resources and their productivity, availability of water, distance from sum 
centre and other locational factors. Grazing fees are set according to these variables, 
based on a combination of an area-based fee and head tax on livestock. This work is 
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now almost complete. Aimag administrations are expected to pay for land evaluation, 
and to recover at least part of the cost by charging grazing and other land use fees (eg. 
for arable crop and vegetable production). 
The first objective can be met by a small or nominal fee. The third objective can be 
achieved at various levels. It is reasonable that grazing fees should contribute towards 
the annual cost of implementing land tenure policy and especially the cost of 
administering, monitoring and enforcing the terms of leases; spread over a number of 
years, they could also recover the cost of setting up the system, including especially the 
initial land assessment. But grazing fees at much higher levels will have to be charged 
if they are to provide a substantial source of additional revenue for local (sum or 
aimag) or even central government, since the levels of fees currently envisaged will 
probably do little more than cover the cost of administering the system. 
PALD research suggests that the imposition of large grazing fees on pastures will not 
be easily accepted by herders. Herders do not yet have the idea of a land tax, as 
opposed to a tax on animals, in their conceptual system. 
The same problems may arise in the case of using differentiated land fees as a way to 
distribute grazing pressure more in relation to ecological productivity (the second 
objective above). In theory, it is a good idea to charge substantially more for high 
quality land, or land near towns, in order to encourage use of lower quality or remote 
pastures. In practice, Mongolian grazing land is not an undifferentiated resource, 
where economic values alone determine behaviour; social, cultural and historical 
elements influence herders' choice of grazing areas. In particular there is the danger 
that high grazing fees will have the opposite effect from that intended: they might instil 
an overly economistic attitude in herders, and a sentiment that the land is no longer 
theirs to be carefully managed by them, but belongs to the government, can be taken 
away at any time, and should therefore be used in ways which maximise short-term 
returns. 
There are no easy solutions to these problems. However, given that much investment 
has already gone into devising a system for charging grazing land fees, certain specific 
recommendations are made here in order to ensure that the stated objectives of the 
system are likely to be met in a manner which is administratively feasible. 
First, it is recommended that leased territorial units be assessed as a whole, as the sum 
of their individual ecological sub-units. The area-based portion of the grazing fee 
should be assessed at the level of the whole group that holds a grazing land lease, not 
at the level of individual herding households. An attempt to do the latter will greatly 
multiply the administrative cost of the system, and makes it more likely that herders 
will dispute their individual fee assessments. It would then be up to the members to 
decide how to share the group fee. It is also in the interests of the whole group to 
collect and pay the fee, since this is one of their obligations under the terms of the 
lease. 
Second, it is recommended that the animal head-tax portion of the grazing fee is 
graduated: that is, as herd size increases, the tax charged on each individual animal 
also rises and, for example, a herder with 100 cattle pays more per animal than a 
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herder with only 20 cattle. This is important if the fee is to achieve its stated objective 
to encourage conservative land use. For this reason, it is recommended that graduated 
animal head taxes be applied at least in the case of land on which it is desirable to 
discourage concentration of livestock numbers, for example, close to sum centres (see 
below). If the head-tax portion of the grazing fee increases only in direct proportion to 
herd size, there is little incentive to herders to limit animal numbers on common 
grazing. With a graduated head tax, as long as other economic incentives are 
favourable, herders have an incentive to maximise productivity per animal rather than 
the total number of animals. 
The same principle of a variable scale of fees applies to the land area-based portion of 
the grazing fee. Groups of herders will only be discouraged from grazing their animals 
on land close to sum centres, for example, if they have to pay a fee that is a lot higher, 
not just a little higher, for doing so. The example of Arkhangai aimag illustrates this 
problem. The proposed range of variation in grazing fees of 4-5 tug/yr is too small to 
be effective as an instrument for changing herders' land use practices. The range of 
variation should probably be in the order of 4-40 tug/yr, depending on total herd size. 
If revenue is raised through fees and taxes of this sort, there is an argument for 
directing it into a local, probably sum level, fund for livestock development, and 
especially into building up a renewed SEFF-type operation to meet emergency fodder 
needs. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper has considered the options for grazing land tenure reform in Mongolia. 
Variability, low productivity and risk in the Mongolian grazing system mean that the 
simple allocation of pastures to individual herding households as private property is 
economically and ecologically unviable. In response to these constraints, Mongolian 
pastoral production currently takes place in a nomadic fashion, regulated by effective 
customary systems of collective grazing resource tenure and management. The 
challenge is to reconcile these customary or informal systems of grazing management 
with the demands of a formal Land Law in ways which are economically efficient, 
socially just and environmentally sustainable. This paper discusses ways to achieve 
such a solution. 
The paper comes to the following main conclusions and recommendations: 
1. Mongolian herding communities are generally organised around the management of 
viable grazing territories, and have effective customary rules and procedures to 
manage the resources of these territories. The period of collectivisation to some extent 
weakened these customary tenure systems, but they are re-emerging rapidly under 
economic reform. They have important weaknesses however, and cannot cope on their 
own with the rapid and far-reaching changes triggered by privatisation and the move to 
a market economy. 
2. Ecological and social conditions vary widely in different parts of Mongolia. It 
would be unwise to try to impose a single general model of grazing land tenure. 
Tenure systems should be adapted to local conditions. 
3. Given ecological and other constraints, private freehold tenure of grazing land by 
individual households is not a viable general solution. Different mixes of public and 
private freehold and leasehold, at individual and group level, offer the best solutions, 
and provide the flexibility needed to adapt the tenure system to varying local 
conditions. 
4. Different resources should have appropriate tenure systems. These include: 
• private individual freehold or public individual leasehold tenure for built structures 
such as winter-spring shelters and small wells; such property should be transferable 
within families but not saleable; 
• public individual leasehold for land around winter shelters, intermediate capacity 
wells, arable and hay fields. In some places this might also be the best solution for 
winter-spring pastures; 
• public group leasehold for summer and winter pastures and large capacity wells 
and boreholes. Where identifiable customary groups of resource users such as well 
or valley groups exist, they should become the leaseholder, constituted for that 
purpose into cooperatives or horshoo\ where they do not exist, it may be necessary 
t 
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to create new economic entities at bag level as a leaseholder. In some cases, 
companies may be appropriate leaseholders. 
5. Reciprocal access agreements between groups to allow a group to use the territory 
of a neighbouring group in the event of an exceptional pasture shortage should be 
encouraged. 
6. The draft Land Law now before Parliament can accommodate these proposed 
tenure policies, with a small number of clarifications and additions: 
• to make clear that individual public leasehold is a possible option for specific 
resources, including hay fields, individual arable and fodder fields and perhaps 
winter-spring pastures; 
• to make clear that the category of economic entities permitted to hold group leases 
of public land includes community groups of herders, notably valley and well-
groups; this can best be achieved by requiring such groups to constitute themselves 
formally as cooperatives or horshoo (which are classified as economic entities) 
under existing legislation; 
• the Land Law, or alternately the Land Policy, should also outline the provision for 
renewable, rolling leases. 
7. Where existing community groups do not exist at the appropriate level, or are 
insufficiently stable or cohesive, a new corporate entity at bag level should become the 
grazing land leaseholder. 
8. Most leases to individuals and groups of grazing land resources (including wells, 
hay and individual arable and fodder fields, and exceptionally winter-spring pastures) 
should be issued on a rolling (ie regularly renewable) basis for 30-40 years, subject to 
regular review of the performance of the leaseholder in keeping the conditions of the 
lease. 
9. The enactment of the Land Law should be followed rapidly by the preparation of a 
general Land Policy giving detailed guidance on how the provisions of the Law should 
be applied in particular cases. Among other things, the Land Policy should specify the 
level and type of community groups who may be given grazing land leaseholds, and the 
conditions, nature and details of rolling leases. 
10. Grazing land fees should be assessed on the territories leased by groups as a 
whole, and be raised and paid by the group leaseholder on behalf of its members. The 
livestock head tax portion of the fee should be graduated, with tax per animal 
increasing as herd size increases. Taxes on grazing land should be substantially 
increased on the best land, and on land close to sum centres as a way of distributing 
grazing pressure more evenly. An important potential use of such fees is to create a 
local livestock development fund, and an emergency fodder fund to replace the SEFF. 
